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INTRODUCTION
For the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, law is “part of a distinct
manner of imagining the real.”1 In Local Knowledge, he argues that,
at a fundamental level, legal systems create a way of envisioning
the world and then develop different kinds of “techniques”—whether
through legal institutions, methods, or doctrines—that make this
vision the correct one.2 The consequence is, of course, that the law
in different countries will “see” different things. This point proves
applicable to the study of comparative privacy law. Building on
Geertz’s insight, this Article searches for distinct as well as shared
aspects of one area of law in two countries. It seeks to determine
whether German and American lawyers, judges, and policymakers
are seeing the same or different things when regulating one form of
technology—namely, data mining.
As a further matter, current privacy scholarship has a great need
for targeted studies that look at specific areas of information use in
different countries. After a first generation of broader comparative
studies, today’s privacy scholarship needs more targeted analysis of
specific areas of data use. As Spiros Simitis has argued, “[e]ffectiveness of data protection law crucially depends on the ability to
react in a fashion that focuses on concrete situations of processing,
and the ones that are especially important from the perspective of
the affected party.”3 In such a fashion, this Article will look at how
the legal systems of Germany and the United States respond to the
use of data mining by the government for law enforcement and
national security purposes.
As an initial matter, it is important to establish certain basic terminology. Americans commonly refer to “data mining”; in Germany,
the standard reference is to “Rasterfahndung,” which literally
means “a screening search.”4 In this Article, I use data mining as
the general term of art and to refer to the practice in the United
1. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 173 (3d ed. 2000).
2. Id.
3. Spiros Simitis, Einleitung [Introduction] to BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ 127 (Spiros
Simitis ed., 6th ed. 2006) (Ger.).
4. See infra Part I.B.
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States. In discussing German law, I refer to this practice as “data
screening.” This term is a closer translation of the German concept,
and its use will permit a reader to know at a glance that a reference
is to Germany. Another benefit of this approach is that it avoids an
assumption that American and German jurists are using the same
mental map when they speak of “data mining” or “data screening,”
respectively.
Although this Article employs these two terms, a computer remains a computer, whether in the United States or Germany, and
the underlying technology in both countries is the same. One can,
therefore, provide a unitary definition of data mining as a series of
techniques for extracting knowledge from large stores of digital
data. Alternative terms for this technique include “knowledge
mining from data, knowledge extraction, data/pattern analysis, data
archaeology, and data dredging.”5 Another definition views data
mining simply as involving “a diverse set of tools for mathematical
modeling.”6
Part I of this Article explores the basic regulation of this technique in Germany and the United States. It finds a long engagement with data screening in Germany, one that dates back to the
battle against the Red Army Faction in the 1970s. German law also
regulates this practice in both federal and state statutes. In
contrast, decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court from the 1970s have
created a constitutional jurisprudence that frees the use of this
process from the strictures of constitutional law. At the statutory
and administrative level, moreover, there is scant regulation of this
practice. Part II then examines the German Federal Constitutional
Court’s Data Screening decision of 2006.7 In this decision, the
German court read strict constitutional requirements into any use
of data screening for so-called “preventive purposes.” Finally, Part
III contrasts the German and American legal approaches to this
5. JIAWEI HAN & MICHELINE KAMBER, DATA MINING: CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 5 (2d
ed. 2006).
6. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
TERRORISTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAM ASSESSMENT 20 (2008) [hereinafter PROTECTING
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY].
7. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 4, 2006, 115
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 320 (para. 8, at 323, para.
28-33, at 329).
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new technology for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This
Article draws comparative lessons about the differences between the
U.S. Supreme Court’s hands-off approach, and the “new constitutionalism” of Germany, which features a constitutional law court
that concentrates solely on interpreting and developing a constitution. This Article further highlights two contrasting approaches, at
the substantive level, to a constitutional law of information privacy.
I. DATA MINING AND RASTERFAHNDUNG (DATA SCREENING)
This Part will explore the basics of German and American regulation of the state’s data mining for law enforcement and intelligence purposes. In the United States, the practices of data mining
are largely unregulated with the main focus placed on the initial
collection of information and not on the processes to which it is
subsequently put. In contrast, data screening is closely regulated in
Germany. It is also organized along a distinction concerning whether this technique is used to investigate past crimes or to carry out
a preventive response to potential crimes.
A. Data Mining in the United States
In the United States, legal policymakers draw a distinction
between “subject-based” and “pattern-based” data mining.8 In subject-based searches, law enforcement officers or intelligence agents
use data mining to gather information about subjects that they
already suspect of possible wrongdoing or that are otherwise of
interest.9 The National Research Council’s blue ribbon report,
Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle Against Terrorists,
places subject-based data mining “[o]n the more routine end of the
spectrum.”10 It observes that this technique involves “the searching
of large databases for characteristics that have been associated with
individuals of interest, that is, people who are worthy of further
8. PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 20-24; see also TECH. & PRIVACY
ADVISORY COMM. DEP’T OF DEF., SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
45 (2004) [hereinafter SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY].
9. PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 21-22.
10. Id. at 20.
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investigation.”11 As a specific example, in subject-based data mining,
officials seek data about “people who own cars with license plates
that are discovered at the scene of a terrorist act or whose fingerprints match those of people known to be involved in terrorist
activity.”12 This technique automates activities that a detective or
intelligence analyst might otherwise have carried out manually
when drawing on analog data.13 Yet this technique also broadens
and expands these activities by allowing officials to make use of the
extensive databases of our Information Age.14
With pattern-based data mining, in contrast, the government
investigator develops a model of assumptions about the activities
and characteristics of culpable individuals or the indicators of
criminal or terrorist plans.15 The investigator then uses computer
software to search databases containing transactional and personal
information for “hits” or matches.16 The search looks for a correspondence between a model of criminal or terrorist plans and the
patterns created by data left by potentially culpable individuals.17
This approach identifies the guilty by their data trails. Particularly
important in pattern-based data mining is a mechanism for feedback so that learning over time is possible.18 In particular, there is
a need to test the assumptions upon which the pattern-based
analysis rests.19
In the United States, constitutional law and criminal procedure
leave data mining, whether subject-based or pattern-based, largely
unregulated. Statutory law does place some limits on the government’s initial ability to collect information.20 There is, however, an
exception to this rule of nonregulation, which concerns a small subcategory of data mining, one largely shrouded in secrecy. In the
11. Id. at 20-21.
12. Id. at 21.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Data Mining and Internet
Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 262-63
(2008); see also SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 45.
16. Rubinstein, Lee & Schwartz, supra note 15, at 262-63.
17. Id.
18. PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 22.
19. Id.
20. SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, supra note 8, at executive summary 4-5.
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) Amendments
Act of 2008, Congress created procedures for the National Security
Agency’s (NSA) surveillance of certain phone calls with a nexus to
the United States.21 At the same time, this statute does not regulate
data mining per se.22
We begin, however, not with the exception, but with the rule. In
American law, the Fourth Amendment is the critical constitutional
provision regarding data mining. The Fourth Amendment establishes the right of the people to be secure from “unreasonable
searches and seizures” in their “papers, and effects.”23 It also prohibits the issuing of search warrants for reasons less than “probable
cause.”24 By the 1970s, the Supreme Court had developed the essential Fourth Amendment case law, and its opinions in United States
v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland remain the leading cases in this
area.25 Due to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the reach of the
Fourth Amendment, data mining is left free of constitutional restrictions.26 The first restriction, from the Miller opinion, finds that
the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to stored data in the control
of third parties.27 The second restriction, from Smith v. Maryland,
finds that the Amendment is inapplicable to any aspect of telecommunications that is not the “content” of a telephone conversation.28
In Miller, the Supreme Court declared that no “legitimate
‘expectation of privacy’” existed in documents that an individual
stored with a third party.29 Miller concerned bank records, and the
Court found that a “depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to
the Government.”30 In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court

21. Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
and 50 U.S.C.).
22. Id.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. Id.
25. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
26. Paul M. Schwartz, German and U.S. Telecommunications Privacy Law: Legal
Regulation of Domestic Law Enforcement Surveillance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 751, 764-65 (2003).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 764.
29. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
30. Id. at 443.
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developed a “content” versus “non-content” distinction.31 It found
that the Fourth Amendment did not protect the phone numbers that
one dialed.32 The petitioner in the case “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that
information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.”33
The Supreme Court drew a distinction in this case with its earlier
opinion in Katz v. United States, in which it had decided that the
Fourth Amendment safeguarded the words spoken during a call
from a telephone booth.34 In Katz, the Court found that the Fourth
Amendment protected communication contents from the “uninvited
ear.”35
Miller and Smith effectively foreclosed the possibility of meaningful constitutional protections from governmental data mining in the
United States. In its use of data mining, the government scrutinizes
personal data, whether through subject-based or pattern-based
searches, that is initially in the control of third parties, as in Miller.
Moreover, this information is generally noncontent, that is, not the
words spoken into a telephone, but various data crumbs that an
individual created and left in the control of third parties, as in
Smith. As the National Research Council’s report summarizes,
“Today, the Miller and Smith decisions allow the government to
obtain the raw material on millions of individuals.”36
At the statutory level, moreover, the law of criminal procedure
simply does not consider data mining a “search.” The logic of Miller
and Smith has carried the day here as well. As an example, the FBI
permits agents to carry out a so-called “assessment” even when
there is “no particular factual predication” about a target.37 Such an
inquiry can include searching databases.38 As a further matter,
statutory law and regulations have encouraged and made routine a

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Id. at 743-44.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 739-42; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 34.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS
GUIDE 39 (2008), available at http://documents.nytimes.com/the-new-operations-manualfrom-the-f-b-i.
38. Id.

358

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:351

widespread sharing of personal information by private sector institutions with the government.
In the context of financial information, we can consider the strict
obligations that the law now places on banks and other entities to
carry out due diligence about their customers and to report suspicious activities to the government. These obligations are considered
essential steps in the prevention of terrorist financing, money
laundering, and other illegal activities.39 As a specific illustration of
such a data flow, regulations promulgated under the Bank Secrecy
Act require financial institutions and other regulated entities to
file reports for every deposit, withdrawal, or other transfer of currency exceeding $10,000.40 More broadly, these regulated entities
must report all “suspicious activities” to the government by filing
“Suspicious Activity Reports” (SARs).41 The Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the U.S. Treasury Department
receives the filed SARs. As the website of FinCEN states, “There are
hundreds of thousands of financial institutions currently subject to
[the Bank Secrecy Act’s] reporting and record keeping requirements.”42
Beyond the Bank Secrecy Act and FinCEN, a wide variety of
federal and state statutes and regulations have standardized the
process of widespread, large-scale transfers of data to the government.43 This information can also be subject to pattern-based or
subject-based data mining. There is one final area to be considered
in a discussion of data mining in the United States, and it concerns
39. See Oil-for-Food Program: Tracking the Funds: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int’l
Relations, 108th Cong. 51-52 (2004) (statement of Herbert A. Biern, Senior Assoc. Dir., Div.
of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Fed. Reserve), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/boarddocs/testimony/2004/20041117/default.htm.
40. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(1) (2010); see also Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508,
84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 31 U.S.C.).
41. See 12 C.F.R. § 208.62 (2011).
42. Forms, FINCEN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.fincen.gov/forms/bsa_forms/
(last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
43. See, e.g., Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006) (regulating use of personal information
by federal agencies); I.R.C. § 6103 (2006) (establishing rules for disclosure of tax record to
executive branch officials, federal officers, Congress, state tax officials, and state and local law
enforcement agencies); DNA Identification Act, 42 U.S.C. §14131 (2006) (establishing rules
under which the FBI indexes DNA identification records). For an analysis of the Internal
Revenue Code’s regulation of governmental access to tax return information, see Paul M.
Schwartz, The Future of Tax Privacy, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 883, 892-95 (2008).
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a specific activity carried out for national security purposes: the
National Security Agency’s widespread monitoring of signal traffic.
In December 2005, a front-page article in the New York Times
first revealed the NSA’s warrantless surveillance program. This
agency was intercepting communications in which one party was
located outside the United States and the other party was located
inside the United States, and it was doing so without gaining
warrants from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).44
This activity proved highly controversial; although much about this
surveillance remains secret, it is clear that the NSA failed to follow
the requirements of the FISA for such surveillance.45 Rather than
seeking to amend FISA so that it would authorize such investigative
authority, the Bush administration directed the NSA to carry out
this activity secretly.46 It even improvised a new kind of process to
work around the later refusal of Attorney General Ashcroft and his
deputy James Comey to assent to the NSA activity.47
It is also clear that the activities in question involved data
mining: the NSA was subjecting data traffic to so-called “umbrella
surveillance.”48 Under FISA, the FISC was required to make a
probable cause determination regarding each “target,” that is, each
individual, and each “facility” of telecommunications before surveillance could be carried out.49 In contrast, the NSA had engaged
in a different approach, under which “the NSA would sweep in a
wide amount of data up front and then sift through it.”50
This process involved data mining. At the end of the sifting process, the FISC would review the NSA’s judgment as to the captured
data.51 An anonymous official also explained at one point in the
44. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
45. Id.; cf. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2000).
46. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 44, at A1.
47. See Paul M. Schwartz, Warrantless Wiretapping, FISA Reform and the Lessons of
Public Liberty: A Comment on Holmes’s Jorde Lecture, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 423 (2009).
48. Id. at 413-14.
49. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a); see also DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS § 15:18 (2007).
50. Schwartz, supra note 47, at 414.
51. As Kris summarizes, the idea was “to move the individualized probable-cause
determination from the front end, to the back end, of the FISA process.” KRIS & WILSON, supra
note 49, § 15:18.
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controversy that the FISC ruling concerned cases “where one end is
foreign and you don’t know where the other is.”52 The Bush administration argued that the FISC’s opinion impeded the government’s
ability to investigate threats of imminent terrorist attacks and
necessitated amendment of FISA.53
Some courts have ruled on challenges to these practices, and some
legal claims remain active. The path of litigation has been rocky,
and the “state secrets” privilege has furnished one particularly
significant obstacle for plaintiffs.54 In the legislative arena, Congress
largely ratified the Bush administration’s path by enacting the FISA
Amendment Act of 2008 (FAA), and even provided retroactive
immunity for the telecommunication companies that participated in
the warrantless wiretapping.55 This statute, however, does create
some additional procedural steps that provide safeguards against
abuse of this procedure.56 We will return to the FAA in Part III.

52. Greg Miller, New Limits Put on Overseas Surveillance, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at
A16.
53. Id.
54. See Schwartz, supra note 47, at 428 (“The state secrets privilege is a common law
evidentiary privilege that has been interpreted by courts in a fashion that adds additional
difficulties for the use of litigation to expose governmental abuses in areas that involve
national security.”). In a major empirical study of the state secrets privilege, Laura Donohue
has demonstrated that both the government and private-sector companies alike are now
relying on it in civil litigation as a powerful litigation tool. Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow
of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77 (2010). Finally, due to FISA’s provision of remedies, the
reward for even successful plaintiffs who surmount all litigation difficulties will likely be
limited. In one case regarding the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping, the government refused
to participate in FISA-mandated discovery, and the federal district court decided to grant the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig., 700 F. Supp.
2d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The result? The individual plaintiffs received $20,400 in liquidated
damages pursuant to FISA 1801(a), which represented $100 a day for violations over a period
of 204 days. In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig., No. 06-1791, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136156
(N.D. Cal. 2010). On a more positive note for litigators, the plaintiffs’ attorneys received
attorney fees of $2.5 million.
55. Specifically, the FAA prohibits a civil action against anyone for assisting the intelligence community in connection with an activity that falls within a defined safe harbor. See
18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (West 2010). This statutory provision led the district court
handling consolidated claims against AT&T to dismiss the actions. In re NSA Telecomm.
Record Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
56. See Schwartz, supra note 47, at 417.
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B. Data Screening in Germany
The German discussion of data mining uses different terms and
has developed along different organizational principles. To illustrate, we reference statutes at the federal and state levels that
regulate the use of data screening. These laws do not draw a
distinction between subject-based and pattern-based data mining,
as in the United States, but distinguish between the use of “data
screening” to (1) investigate past crimes, or (2) permit a prevention
response to potential crimes. The latter technique is also called
“strategic data screening.”
In Germany, data screening is an established technique of law
enforcement authorities. Its use by law enforcement dates back to
the 1970s and the country’s struggle against the Red Army Faction
(RAF).57 The German pioneer of this technique and its legendary
champion was Horst Herold, head of the Bundeskriminalamt, or
Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This federal agency is the
national investigative police authority of Germany and is located
within the Federal Ministry of the Interior. It is analogous to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States.
The German neologism for data screening is “Rasterfahndung.”
“Fahndung” means to search; and a “Raster” is a screen. Thus, the
term literally refers to a “screening search.” In 1980, the Society for
the German Language selected “Rasterfahndung” as the Word of the
Year.58 A classic example of a data screening by Herold’s BKA
occurred in 1979. Herold suspected that the RAF had one or more
apartments in Frankfurt am Main that it was using for conspirative
purposes.59 Another German neologism describes such a dwelling.
The applicable term is a “konspirative Wohnung,” or conspirative
apartment, which was the German Word of the Year in 1978.60
Herold decided, correctly as it turned out, that terrorists were
likely to pay for electricity differently than most Germans.61 In
57. See Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy
Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 653 (2007).
58. Wort des Jahres, GESELLSCHAFT FÜR DEUTSCHE SPRACHE, http://www.gfds.de/index.
php?id=11 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
59. DIETER SCHENK, DER CHEF—HORST HEROLD UND DAS BKA 399 (2000).
60. GESELLSCHAFT FÜR DEUTSCHE SPRACHE, supra note 58.
61. SCHENK, supra note 59, at 399.
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his assessment, terrorists would be unlikely to transfer money
directly from their bank account to a public utility’s bank account.62
In Germany, it is common to use bank-to-bank transfers
(Überweisungen) to pay regularly occurring charges. A bank examines identity documents, however, when one opens an account with
it. As a result, Herold thought terrorists would use cash and pay
their electricity bill in person at the utility.63 This tactic would keep
their apartments associated with a false name.
Herold’s operation involved a data screening of the list of approximately 18,000 utility customers who paid cash against various lists
of “legal names.”64 These certified identities were collected by recourse to the data files of various agencies and organizations. The
legal names included people listed at the Registration Office for
Inhabitants (Einwohnermeldeamt), owners of automobiles, retirees,
students receiving government scholarships, owners of real estate,
purchasers of fire insurance, and people receiving health insurance
from publicly-authorized companies.65
Pursuant to a court order, the electric company in Frankfurt am
Main gave Herold computer tapes with the list of its cash paying
customers.66 Herold then screened these tapes against the computer
tapes with the certified names. This process revealed two false
names associated respectively with two apartments.67 One false
name proved to be used by a drug dealer, and the other was used by
a terrorist that the BKA was seeking to arrest.68 Shortly after the
data match, law enforcement was able to arrest the terrorist, Rolf
Heiler, in the “conspirative apartment.”69
Today, data screening in investigations of past crimes, such as
those investigations that Herold carried out, is regulated by various
state laws and at the federal level by section 98a of the Criminal

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 399-401.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. For an account of a similar investigative approach by Herold after the kidnapping
of Hanns-Martin Schleyer, see STEFAN AUST, DER BAADER MEINHOF KOMPLEX 654 (3d ed.
2008) (Ger.).
69. SCHENK, supra note 59, at 399-400.
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Procedural Code (Strafprozeßordnung).70 The federal statute applies
when the BKA takes a lead role in investigating crimes considered
to be a federal matter. The Criminal Procedure Code’s basic approach also reflects the approach the different state laws take, and
our discussion can, therefore, concentrate on the federal statute.
C. The Statutory Regulation of Data Screening
In section 98a, the Criminal Procedure Code regulates the
“automatic comparison and transfer of personal data.”71 It requires
“sufficient factual indications to show that a criminal offense of
significant importance has been committed.”72 Thus, this statute
squarely requires proof of the existence of a crime. It can be used for
subject-based or pattern-based investigations, to use the American
concepts, but only under narrow circumstances. As section 98a of
the Criminal Procedure Code indicates, this statute requires a sufficient level of proof both that a crime has been committed and that
this crime is on a list of selected, significant predicate offenses. It
also restricts use of data screening to situations in which “other
means of establishing the facts or determining the perpetrator’s
whereabouts would be considerably less promising or would be
much more difficult.”73 Further, section 98b mandates a judicial
order for data screening, unless exigent circumstances exist.74
Thus, Criminal Procedure Code sections 98a-b indicate that
German law cabins data mining carefully. The leading empirical
examination of the practice of data screening found a significant

70. S TRAFPROZE ß ORDNUNG [S T PO] [C ODE OF C RIMINAL P ROCEDURE ], 1
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL. I] 1074, § 98a (1987).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 98b. The statute also permits data screening to be carried out both for so-called
“positive” screening, to identify potential suspects, or negative screening, to exclude people
from a list of potential suspects. It states, “personal data relating to individuals fulfilling
certain presumed characteristics of the perpetrator may be compared by machine with other
data in order to exclude individuals not under suspicion or to identify individuals who meet
other characteristics meaningful to the investigation.” Id. As an example of a positive
screening, under Herold’s leadership, the BKA screened customers who paid their electricity
bill with cash against certified names to find potential suspects. See supra text accompanying
notes 61-69.
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increase in the use of subject-based data mining since 2002.75 Its
most significant deployment was in cases involving murders or
manslaughter, sexually motivated crimes, and serial criminal
offenses.76
In contrast to federal law in Germany, there are state statutes
that permit a preventive use of this practice.77 To illustrate such a
pattern-based approach, the police would start by considering the
data trails left by the al-Qaeda terrorists who were responsible for
the 9/11 attacks in the United States. The police would develop a
computer model that captured these patterns and then run a search
of recent data to identify suspects. Such an investigation would be
a “preventive investigation” in the terminology of German law. In
2006, the German Federal Constitutional Court established significant limits on such law enforcement use of data screening.78 We
now turn to this decision.
II. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S DATA SCREENING
OPINION
In this opinion, the Federal Constitutional Court found data
screening to be constitutional only if justified by the existence of a
“concrete danger” to the security of the country, an individual state,
or the life of a citizen.79 Most of the Constitutional Court’s opinion
explained why data screening posed a significant infringement upon
the German constitutional right of informational self-determination
and further developed its existing proportionality test as a constitutional yardstick for evaluating the permissibility of data screening.80
This part of the opinion ultimately found the contested statute to be
constitutional, and all justices joined this outcome. Nonetheless, in
a second, shorter part of its judgment, the Constitutional Court
declared unconstitutional a lower court’s judgment upholding a data
75. DIRK PEHL, DIE IMPLEMENTATION DER RASTERFAHNDUNG 292 (2008) (Ger.).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Polizeigesetz des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen [PolG NW] [North RhineWestphalia Police Statute], 10 GESETZ- UND VERORDNUNGSBLATT FÜR DAS LAND NORDRHEINWESTFALEN [GV NRW] 70, § 31 (1990).
78. BVerfG Apr. 4, 2006, 115 BVERFGE 320.
79. Id.
80. See infra Part II.B.2.
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screening operation in 2001 in North Rhine-Westphalia.81 Two
members of the Court dissented from its rejection of the holding of
the lower court, and one of these judges, Justice Evelyn Haas, wrote
a stinging dissent.82
A. Background of the Case
Immediately after the terrorist attacks in the United States on
September 11, 2001, a committee of Interior Ministers of the
German states, under the BKA’s leadership, developed a plan for
the state criminal police to carry out a data screening operation to
discover cells of “sleeper” terrorists in Germany.83 The criminal
police collected personal data from universities, the Registration
Office for Inhabitants, and the Central Register for Foreigners.
According to the Constitutional Court, the different police headquarters received “data batches” (Datensätze) with information on 5.2
million persons.84 The police then used computers to search through
these data using the following criteria: men; age from eighteen to
forty years old; student or former student; Islamic religion; land of
birth or nationality in certain specific countries with a majority
Islamic population.85
The information collected at the state level was then transferred
to the BKA, where it was incorporated into a federal database
termed “Sleepers.” According to the BKA, this file included 31,988
entries.86 The BKA screened this information against further data
that it had collected.87 Matching information was placed in a

81. See infra text accompanying note 98.
82. See infra Part II.C.
83. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 7-10, at 323-24).
84. Id. para. 8, at 323, para. 28-33, at 329.
85. Id. para. 26, at 328.
86. Id. para. 9, at 324.
87. In its opinion, the Constitutional Court cited an estimate by the Federal Data
Protection Commissioner that the BKA’s electronic dossier used in this comparison
(Abgleichsdaten) contained information on about 200,000 to 300,000 persons. Id. The
Constitutional Court did not provide complete details as to the contents of this second file; it
did state, however, that among the contents was information on individuals who had applied
for a pilot’s license and persons that required a “Reliability Check” (Zuverlässigkeitsprüfung)
under the Nuclear Energy Act because of involvement in maintaining or running nuclear
plants or transporting nuclear material. Id.

366

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:351

“results file” (Ergebnisdatei) and made available to state offices of
criminal police.88
The data screening was controversial and led to numerous media
reports about it as well as protests on privacy grounds involving,
among others, state data protection commissioners.89 The data
protection commissioners raised questions about whether law enforcement officials had followed constitutional and statutory norms
in their data screening procedures.
The data screening also took place against a history of individuals
and groups in Germany with ties to Osama bin Laden.90 As the
report of the 9/11 Commission in the United States later made clear,
one such cell supplied key participants, including Mohamed Atta,
for the 9/11 attacks on the United States.91 Beyond the Hamburg
cell, individuals with ties to bin Laden also lived in North RhineWestphalia, which was the locus of the data screening operation
that the Constitutional Court of Germany evaluated in its opinion.92
As we will see, the dissenting opinion in the Constitutional Court’s
Data Screening decision emphasized the significance of the presence
of these individuals in the state as a justification for the contested
law enforcement activity. Despite these terrorists’ ties to Germany,
however, the contested data screening was notably unsuccessful and
all information in the results dossier was erased in 2003 and 2004.93
As the Constitutional Court noted, “The data screening led in no
instance, as far as is apparent, to the discovery of ‘sleepers,’ or,
based on knowledge gained, even to charges against one of the registered persons, such as charges due to membership in or in support
of a terrorist organization.”94

88. Id. The Court also explained that the BKA considered a “hit” between the two dossiers
to be any match in two parts of the file, “such as name and date of birth or name and land of
birth.” Id.
89. Id. para. 59, at 338.
90. Id. para. 25, at 328.
91. NAT’L COMM. ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
160-69 (2004).
92. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 11-33, at 324-31).
93. Id. para. 32, at 330-31.
94. Id. para. 10, at 324 (internal citation omitted).
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B. The “Concrete Danger” Requirement
A former student at the University of Duisburg challenged the
statutory authorization for the post-9/11 data screening operation.
The plaintiff, who was of Moroccan nationality, was a member of the
Muslim faith whose personal information had been included in the
data screening operation.95 North Rhine-Westphalia Police Statute
Section 31 provided the authorization for the challenged activity.96
As in numerous other German states, the critical statutory language
allowed data screening when “necessary to defend against a present
danger (gegenwärtige Gefahr) to the existence or the security of the
federation or a state, or the body, life, or freedom of a person.”97
After losing his case before two lower courts, the plaintiff brought
his claim to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court
found that the lower courts, in upholding this data screening
operation, had interpreted the statute in a fashion that violated his
constitutional right to informational self-determination.98
1. The Right to Informational Self-Determination
The right of informational self-determination is a special part of
the German constitution’s general right of personality, which is
based on the Basic Law’s Article 2(1) and Article 1(1).99 The general
right of personality, as the Constitutional Court noted in its Data
Screening opinion, “is a gap-filling guarantee” that “is especially
required against the background of novel dangers for the development of personality that appear in accompaniment to the progress
of science and technology.”100 In response to such changes, the
Constitutional Court has developed new, substantive elements of
the right of personality. From the general right, the Constitutional
Court has identified further individual interests, including a right
Id. para. 56, at 337.
See supra note 77.
Id.
115 BVERFGE 320 (341-66).
See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [BASIC LAW FOR THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY], 1 BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL.I] 1 (1949).
100. 115 BVERFGE 320 (341-66). The Court had also made this point in an earlier decision.
BVerfG Dec. 15, 1999, 101 BVERFGE 361 (380).
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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to a private sphere in which one is to be free to shape her life,101 a
right to one’s spoken word,102 and, of particular relevance in the
Data Screening case, a right to informational self-determination.103
For the Constitutional Court, the data screening operation, like
its earlier Census case,104 raised issues concerning the threat of
modern means of surveillance to an individual’s underlying communicative ability. The concern was with a person “who is unable
with sufficient security to assess the knowledge of information that
concerns him in certain sectors of his social environment, who
cannot to some extent estimate the knowledge of possible communication partners.”105 Electronic data processing systems raised
special dangers in this regard: “At any time and regardless of physical distance, these data can subsequently not only be called up in
seconds, but, moreover and above all, can be combined with other
data collections through the construction of integrated information
systems, which develops the possibility for multiple uses and
connections.”106
The right of informational self-determination protects the individual against such new technological threats. It safeguards the
general ability to decide “when and within which borders, personal
life facts are revealed.”107 At the same time, however, the right of
informational self-determination does not create a right of absolute
control over personal data. In 1983, in the Census decision, the
Constitutional Court had already stated, “The individual does not
have a right in the sense of an absolute mastery over ‘his’ data; he
is rather a personality that develops within a social community and
is dependent upon communication.”108 Information relating to a
person, as the court observed in that case, depicts “an image of social reality that the affected party cannot exclusively coordinate.”109
101. BVerfG Jan. 16, 1957, 6 BVERFGE 32.
102. BVerfG Jan. 31, 1973, 34 BVERFGE 238.
103. BVerfG Dec. 15, 1963, 65 BVERFGE 1.
104. Id.
105. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 69, at 341). The Court noted the danger that this person “can
be fundamentally obstructed in planning or decision making based on his individual selfdetermination.” Id.
106. Id. para. 70, at 342.
107. Id. para. 69, at 341.
108. 65 BVERFGE 1 (43-44).
109. Id.
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The court repeated similar concerns in its Data Screening opinion.
For example, it stated, “The fundamental right of informational selfdetermination is not guaranteed without limits. Rather, the individual must accept such limitations of his right that are justified by
weightier public interests.”110
2. Proportionality Review and the Failure of the Lower Courts
Thus, German constitutional law permits limits on the right of
informational self-determination when there is some more significant public purpose. Yet constitutional law also obliges the lawmaker to express such limits on the right in a statute that meets the
constitutional principle of proportionality. The established threepart test for proportionality requires the state to follow a legitimate
goal with means that are (1) suitable, (2) necessary, and (3) proportionate in the narrow sense.111 The third part of the test requires
a choice of means that are commensurate with the benefits.112 The
Constitutional Court has employed this measure of judicial review
frequently and in a variety of settings, which meant it had a welldeveloped jurisprudence upon which to draw in its Data Screening
opinion.113 Its proportionality review led, in turn, to the case’s key
holding, which is that a data screening statute is constitutionally
permissible only when there is “a concrete danger” to a legal interest.114
110. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 81, at 344-45). In the Census decision itself, the
Constitutional Court made this point at the same time as it identified the right of
informational self-determination. 65 BVERFGE 1 (43-44). In fact, Hans-Peter Bull argues that
the Constitutional Court has lost track of this part of its vision and has turned the right of
informational self-determination into a more purely individualistic interest. In doing so, it
ignores the role that security, personal and shared, plays in freedom. HANS-PETER BULL,
INFORMATIONELLE SELBSTBESTIMMUNG—VISION ODER ILLUSION? (2009) (Ger.).
111. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 82, at 345).
112. Id. para. 88, at 345.
113. See, e.g., BVerfG Jul. 18, 1973, 35 BVERFGE 382 (para. 63, at 400-01); BVerfG Mar.
5, 1968, 23 BVERFGE 127 (para. 19, at 133-34).
114. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 133-53, at 360-67); see also BVerfG Mar. 2, 2010, 125
BVERFGE 260 (para. 231, at 330) (telecommunications data retention); BVerfG Feb. 27, 2008,
120 BVERFGE 274 (para. 233-35, at 328-29) (online surveillance). Although Daniel Solove does
not discuss the German cases in his scholarship, his most recent book advocates a similar
approach. Solove indicates acceptance of data mining only “when there’s a specific threat and
specific information about the likely perpetrators.” DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE 195
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It would be useful at this juncture to provide a roadmap of the
Court’s path to its holding. It first considered the extent to which
data screening represented a grave violation of an individual right.
Drawing on examples from constitutional decisions about telecommunications surveillance and other areas of law, the Constitutional
Court found that data screening represented a weighty invasion of
the right of informational self-determination.115 Nonetheless, it
decided that this procedure was not per se disproportionate and,
hence, not facially unconstitutional.116 Yet before law enforcement
officials could use this procedure, they had to demonstrate a
concrete danger.117 Finally, the Constitutional Court decided that
although a constitutional application of the contested statute was
possible, the lower courts in North Rhine-Westphalia had not
interpreted it in the required fashion and held the state to the
correct standard.118
Under proportionality review, an assessment of the permissibility
of an invasion of a constitutional right begins with an assessment
of the significance, or weight, of the harm to the interest.119 A heavy
interference with the right of informational self-determination
would require, in turn, an equally serious justification, or it would
be disproportionate. The Constitutional Court identified multiple
reasons why the invasion of the right was highly significant, and, as
we shall see, this very multiplicity of grounds led Justice Haas, in
dissent, to express skepticism at an explanation that was too
complicated for her taste. We remain for the time being, however,
with the majority.
For the Constitutional Court, the first impact of the data
screening was through its scrutiny of information about which

(2011).
115. See, e.g., BVerfG July 27, 2005, 113 BVERFGE 348 (para. 139-46, at 382-84). In this
case, the Constitutional Court held that a state law allowing preventive telecommunication
surveillance (vorbeugende Telefonüberwachung) violated the privacy of telecommunications.
It regarded the invasion as weighty because of its possibility of screening communication
patterns, its great breadth (große Streubreite), and the lack of knowledge of the person
concerned.
116. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 125, at 357).
117. Id. para. 158, at 368.
118. Id. para. 158-61, at 368-70.
119. Id. para. 136, at 360.
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individuals had “an expectation of confidentiality.”120 The statute in
North Rhine-Westphalia was broadly drafted to permit access to all
“data necessary for the individual case.”121 This language proved
extremely significant later in the opinion, as both constitutional and
unconstitutional readings of it were possible. At this point in its
opinion, however, the Court was interested in the language because
of its sweep. According to it, the statute permitted access to such
personal data in which the individual “possesses a high interest and
on whose confidentiality he relies,” including data about religious
beliefs.122
There were additional reasons that the data screening had a
significant impact on informational self-determination. As the
Constitutional Court discussed, data screening created a dangerous
potential for the “warehousing of personal data” and the creation of
“personality profiles.”123 It would subject certain persons to further
official investigations and stigmatize those persons whose information was swept up in the search. It was also carried out in secret,
which increased its intensity for the individual.124 Any legal
protections for the individual would take effect only once the data
screening was completed.125 Finally, the data searches invaded a
fundamental right without suspicion and in a manner of “great
breadth” (große Streubreite).126 Regarding the reach of the invasion,
the Constitutional Court observed that the personal data of some
5.2 million people were involved and that the nature of data
screening permitted the processing of “larger and more complex
databases with greater speed and nearly at will.”127

120. Id. para. 99, at 348.
121. Id. para. 101, at 349.
122. Id.
123. Id. para. 106, at 351; see also 113 BVERFGE 348 (para. 140, at 382-83) (preventive
telecommunication surveillance); 120 BVERFGE 274 (para. 214, at 323) (online surveillance);
125 BVERFGE 260 (para. 211, at 319) (telecommunications data retention).
124. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 114, at 353).
125. Id.
126. Id. para. 116, at 354; see also 120 BVERFGE 274 (para. 143, at 323); 113 BVERFGE 348
(para. 142, at 383).
127. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 122. at 356). It also drew a contrast with “strategic
surveillance” by the BND, with references to its case law in that area, and noted that the
purpose of data screening was, from its start, to lead to investigations of specific individuals.
Id. para. 139, at 362.
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Despite the weightiness of the invasion of the right of informational self-determination, the Constitutional Court was unwilling to find data screening to be per se unconstitutional. As Dirk
Heckmann summarized in his analysis of the opinion, “The constitutionality of data screening as such was not questioned.”128
Rather, the analysis concentrated on the conditions under which a
preventive data screening could pass constitutional muster. The
Court’s lesson from its proportionality jurisprudence was that the
legislature could permit a weighty invasion of a fundamental right
only when a certain risk of danger had been reached. More specifically, when an action was to be taken “in advance” (im Vorfeld) of
the harm, the Basic Law required the legislature to be concerned
with the probability of the danger actually occurring.129 The
Constitutional Court also announced rules for the use of a “lasting
danger” (Dauergefahr) as justification for data screening.130
In the absence of a concrete danger, data screening was constitutionally problematic.131 As a result, the court reached a key part of
its holding and required “a state of affairs, under which in the
actual case there is a sufficient probability of a damage ... in the
near future (absehbarer Zeit).”132 Beyond such an “establishment of
concrete dangers,” the court also required a “prognosis of probability” based on facts that the predicted harm would occur.133 The court
added, “Vague clues or bare suppositions are not sufficient.”134
A lasting threat could also constitute a concrete danger and
justify data screening. Yet, the court cautioned, “Foreign political
areas of tension that terrorists could use as an occasion for attacks
128. Dirk Heckmann, Präventive polizeiliche Rasterfahndung, jurisPR-ITR (6/2006).
129. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 140, at 361); see also 113 BVERFGE 348 (para. 151, at 386);
120 BVERFGE 274 (para. 227, at 327) (“The required probability and facts of the prediction
have to be proportionate to the type and weightiness of the intrusion of the basic right. Even
in the case of threatening severe intrusions to basic rights, the requirement of an adequate
probability of occurrence (hinreichende Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit) is indispensable.”).
130. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 147, at 364).
131. Id. para. 138, at 362. Here, the Constitutional Court repeated many of its earlier
arguments, or variations of them, about the heavy impact of data screening. For example, the
procedure would sweep in many people, and without specific suspicion about each person. It
also had a broad reach, and it could seize personal information with “an intensive reference
to personality.” Id.
132. Id. para. 144, at 364.
133. Id.
134. Id. para. 145, at 364.
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always exist,” and this state of affairs “can last a long time.”135 As a
result, the Constitutional Court concluded:
As a practical manner, it is never out of the question that
terrorist actions can hit Germany or can be prepared there. A
general threat situation, which has existed practically without
a break since September 11, 2001, that is for more than four
years now, or foreign tensions are not sufficient for the ordering
of data screening.136

Due to its impact on the right of informational self-determination,
the use of data screening required proof of actual preparations for
a terrorist attack. The Court stated a requirement of “[t]he submission of further facts that would prove a concrete danger, perhaps
through factual clues for the preparation of terroristic attacks or the
presence in Germany of persons who are preparing terrorist attacks
that in the near future will be perpetrated in Germany or elsewhere.”137
At this point, the Constitutional Court had articulated a full set
of constitutional requirements for the use of data screening under
the proportionate standard of judicial review. It could now turn to
the final question, which was the constitutional permissibility of the
contested statute in North Rhine-Westphalia. In the constitutional
law of Germany, as in the United States, there is an established
doctrine that requires courts to interpret statutes, when alternative
readings are possible, in conformity with the constitution.138 A
constitutionally permissible reading of the statute turned on a
processing of data under the conditions of a “present danger” and
access to only such data that were “necessary for the individual
case.” The Constitutional Court found that the statute would
achieve “constitutionally sufficient certainty” when interpreted as
requiring a concrete threat level, not merely “a general danger of

135. Id. para. 147, at 364.
136. Id. para. 147, at 364-65.
137. Id.
138. In the United States, Justice Louis Brandeis articulated this principle of judicial selfrestraint in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936). For a
discussion of a similar doctrine in Germany, see DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 50-51 (2d ed. 1997).
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terrorism,” before permitting data screening.139 In other words, the
Constitutional Court read a requirement of “concrete danger” into
the concept of “necessary for the individual case.” Only when such
a risk existed could the data screening be viewed as necessary.
The Court had reached the final step in its opinion. It declared
that the lower courts had failed to interpret the statute in the
fashion that the Basic Law required. For example, the Higher
Regional Court had upheld the data screening with the argument
that “the possibility of an especially grave occurrence of danger
could not be excluded.”140 Yet it was not enough to identify the size
of the damage that terrorism could cause; it was also necessary to
evaluate the probability of the success of the measure that was used
to defend against this harm. The Constitutional Court pointed to the
need for “sufficiently concrete facts” that showed “in some way a
probability of a preparation of terrorists attacks by persons, who
could have been classified as terroristic ‘sleepers’ and, correspondingly, who could have been found through the data screening.”141
C. The Dissent
In dissent, Justice Haas disagreed with the part of the majority
opinion that found that the opinions of the lower court were unconstitutional.142 For Justice Haas, moreover, there was a different path
than the majority’s to find the North Rhine-Westphalia statute to
be constitutional. There was no need to read a “concrete danger”
requirement into the statute; rather, it should have been upheld
because of the constitutional obligation on the state to protect
freedom, and, hence, security.143
Justice Haas first disagreed with the majority in her view that
the data screening at stake in the case did not represent an especially onerous burden on any personal interest.144 Beyond this point,
she also pointed out that the majority had ignored strong constitu139. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 151, at 366).
140. Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Düsseldorf [Higher, Regional Court] Feb. 8, 2002, 3 WX
356/01 (para. 17) (unpublished).
141. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 160, at 369).
142. Id. para. 181, at 379 (Haas, J., dissenting).
143. Id. para. 182-84, at 380-81.
144. Id. para. 169-172, at 371-74.
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tional interests furthered by the data comparison. In her view, the
state’s action “secured and furthered the freedom of the individual
who was affected by the data comparison.”145 Statutes expanding
the authority of government to engage in surveillance in Germany
have been frequently justified by an appeal to the requirements of
domestic security.146 Her dissent in the Data Screening opinion
sought to build these arguments into a doctrine of constitutional
politics. She stated: “The fundamental right to freedom requires the
guaranteeing of security by the State.... Security is the fundamental
basis on which freedom can fully develop itself.”147 The true
intimidation effect was created, Justice Haas added, not through a
minor invasion of privacy by data screening, but through a “fear of
people for their life and health” created by the threat of terrorism.148
From the centrality of this right to “freedom from fear,” the dissent turned to four consequences of the law enforcement activity
before the Constitutional Court. First, data screening was a complicated process that “required significant time until its conclusion.”149 In the case before the court, for example, the data
screening operation took twenty months.150 Such a “time-consuming
type” of police activity simply could not be carried out within the
framework of a “concrete” danger and a probability analysis.151
Second, a proportionality analysis should be based on the size of
the possible damage. As Justice Haas summarized when stating her
understanding of police law, “The greater the feared damage, the
lower the requirements regarding the probability of the beginning
of the harm to permit the police to become active.”152 In this context,
it was important to remember that terrorists had already engaged
in threats and also deeds with “consequences of a never-before
experienced dimension (New York, London, Madrid) and more can

145. Id. para. 174, at 374.
146. For example, STPO, BGBL. I 1074, § 98a was codified in order to pursue drug
trafficking and other organized crimes. Id. para. 4, at 321-22 (majority opinion).
147. Id. para. 174, at 374 (Haas, J., dissenting); see also 125 BVERFGE 260 (para. 315-36,
at 367-80) (Schluckebier, J., dissenting).
148. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 175, at 375) (Haas, J., dissenting).
149. Id. para. 178, at 377.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. para. 179, at 378.
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take place.”153 The need was to allow the police to develop their investigations in a “temporal corridor” before “the danger could occur
or be directly imminent.”154
Third, as the Higher Regional Court had emphasized, there were
“actual leads that affirmed a terrorist threat, which justified the
carrying out of the data screening.”155 Justice Haas noted that two
of the participants in the attacks on September 11, 2001, in the
United States had their residence in North Rhine-Westphalia and
that the police also were aware of forty-two other contact persons or
supporters of Osama bin Laden who were present in that German
state.156 Moreover, as a member of NATO, Germany had a responsibility to support the alliance’s duty of collective self-defense and
engage in measures against terrorism.157 As a final matter, Justice
Haas pointed to the judiciary’s obligation to respect the division of
power among the branches and to leave adequate decision-making
authority in this area to the legislative branch.158 The Basic Law
assigned authority to the legislature to react to new situations and
to provide “precautionary measures against risk.”159 Using the
English term in parentheses, Haas concluded by discussing the need
both for “richterliche Zurückhaltung (‘judicial self-restraint’)” and
for respect for the “generative possibilities” of the democratically
legitimized legislature.160
III. NEW TECHNOLOGY AND A TALE OF TWO CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS
In this final Part, I wish to contrast the intensive confrontation
with new technology by the German Constitutional Court with the
lack of a similar engagement by the U.S. Supreme Court. I will also
153. Id. para. 177, at 376.
154. Id.
155. Id. para. 181, at 379.
156. Id. Justice Haas also pointed out the majority opinion’s failure to mention these links
between North Rhine-Westphalia and these terrorists. Id.
157. Id.
158. For a law review article agreeing with this point, see Winfried Bausback, Fesseln für
die Wehrhafte Demokratie?, 59 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1922, 1922-23
(2006) (Ger.).
159. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 184, at 380) (Haas, J., dissenting).
160. Id. para. 184, at 380-81; see also 125 BVERFGE 260 (para. 326, at 373) (Schluckebier,
J., dissenting).
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link the German court’s decision-making techniques to elements
of a “new constitutionalism” in post-war Europe. I will follow this
institutional analysis with a discussion of the differences between
German and American approaches to informational privacy.
A. New Technology and the “New Constitutionalism” of Europe
The contrast could not be starker between the Federal
Constitutional Court’s significant involvement in regulating the
government’s data mining and the U.S. Supreme Court’s hands-off
approach. The Constitutional Court engaged in a careful analysis of
the contested statute in its Data Screening case, evaluated the
interpretation of the statute by lower courts, and developed a series
of constitutional norms for use in this area. It even discussed the
wide-reaching implications of its decision for other state statutes
that regulated data screening.161 The Constitutional Court also has
demonstrated a similar level of significant involvement regarding
law enforcement’s collection and processing of information in other
major decisions. These include a series of opinions regarding preventive telecommunications surveillance,162 online surveillance,163
and data retention.164
As this Article has also shown, by the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme
Court developed a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has kept
the judiciary on the sidelines concerning data mining. There is no
American equivalent of the Data Screening opinion, and the conceptual space for such a decision does not exist so long as Miller and
Smith stand. The differences in this respect clearly demonstrate the
phenomenon of the rise of constitutional law within post-war
Europe and the key role that specialized constitutional courts play
in these legal systems. We can sketch three initial aspects of the
constitutional law of Europe in the post-World War II period.
First, post-war constitutions are typically far more extensive and
specific than a founding document from the eighteenth century,
161. For the clearest overview of the different measures of the statute data screening laws,
see STEFAN MIDDEL, INNERE SICHERHEIT UND PRÄVENTIVE TERRORISMUSBEKÄMPFUNG 124-34
(2007) (Ger.).
162. 113 BVERFGE 348 (preventive telecommunications surveillance).
163. 120 BVERFGE 274 (online surveillance).
164. 125 BVERFGE 260 (telecommunications data retention).

378

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:351

such as the U.S. Constitution. As of April 2011, the German
Constitution consists of 146 separate articles, which incorporate all
post-1949 amendments, and uses 24,132 words.165 In contrast, the
U.S. Constitution consists of 7 articles and 27 amendments and uses
7622 words.166
Second, post-war E.U. constitutions typically contain more detailed rights provisions than the U.S. Constitution.167 These interests are structured as both negative and positive rights. Negative
constitutional rights, such as are found in the United States, only
prevent the state from engaging in certain actions. Positive constitutional rights require the state to take certain positive, protective actions.168 For the purpose of this Article, the most important
such positive rights in Germany are the general right of personality
and its sub-category, the right of informational self-determination.
Third, the post-war constitutions of Europe typically assign a
central role in developing the higher law to a constitutional court
that is separate from the rest of the court system. These specialized
courts are assigned the task of being the final arbiter of all constitutional issues. In the analysis of Alec Stone Sweet, the European
model of constitutional review has led to a “new constitutionalism.”169 In Germany, this new constitutionalism is demonstrated
by the Constitutional Court’s strong engagement in developing and
shaping constitutional norms to respond to the threat of technological developments to civil liberties.
Sweet has drawn a clear picture of these powerful courts. In his
description, the new constitutional courts “have links with, but are
formally detached from, the judiciary and legislature.”170 This
institution occupies its “own ‘constitutional’ space, a space neither
clearly ‘judicial’ nor ‘political.’”171 Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court,
these new higher law courts do not decide general legal matters as
a court of last resort. Rather, their exclusive focus is on constitu165. See supra note 99, as last revised by article 1 of the law of July 21, 2010, 38
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL.I] 944.
166. See U.S. CONST.
167. For an illustrative table of “rights and responsibilities in European constitutions,” see
ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES 42-43 tbl.2.1 (2000).
168. For a discussion, see KOMMERS, supra note 138, at 30-40.
169. SWEET, supra note 167, at 37.
170. Id. at 34.
171. Id.
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tional matters—with decision making possible even without a “case
or controversy” in the American sense.172 These courts act as
“specialized legislative organs.”173 The result has been, as Sweet observes, a shift in power to courts that have developed wide discretionary powers and have “judicialized” and “constitutionalized”
policy areas.174
The Data Screening opinion contains all the hallmarks of the new
constitutionalism that Sweet identifies. The Constitutional Court
infused an area involving complex technology with its own interpretation and development of constitutional norms. As Sweet observes,
these courts typically view “certain constitutional provisions as
open-ended invitations to generate ‘new’ unenumerated rights.”175
Thus, the court’s identification of the right of informational selfdetermination followed from its open-ended view of the general
right of personality. In fact, two years after its Data Screening
opinion, the Constitutional Court returned again to the right of
personality and articulated a new right in its Online Surveillance
decision: the right to “trust and integrity in information systems.”176
In its Data Screening opinion, the Constitutional Court acted,
moreover, through a technique that Sweet finds typical for such
courts: a proportionality analysis.177 Such techniques are highly
indeterminate, which allow constitutional courts to weigh a broad
set of factors and to leave options open for future decisions. Sweet
also identifies a “principal-agent” strategy that these courts use
based on courts that permit other governmental branches a “partial
victory,” but that also requires them to make changes in statutes or
regulations.178 The result is to infuse ever greater areas of law and
policy with constitutional law. In its Data Screening opinion, the
Constitutional Court favored just such a use of the “partial victory”
as a savvy “principal” seeking to enlist “agents.” It did not invalidate
172. Id.
173. Id. at 61.
174. Id. at 194-203.
175. Id. at 98-99.
176. 120 BVERFGE 274 (para. 166, at 302). For contrasting opinions of this decision,
compare Oliver Lepsius, Das Computer-Grundrecht, in ONLINE-DURCHSUCHUNGEN 21, 52-54
(Fredrik Roggan ed., 2008) (skeptical), with Alexander Dix, Neue Perspektiven für den Schutz
Personenbezogener Daten?, in ONLINE-DURCHSUCHUNGEN, supra, at 71 (positive).
177. SWEET, supra note 167, at 117, 142.
178. Id. at 88-90, 117.
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the statute at hand, that of North Rhine-Westphalia, but faulted the
decision of the lower courts that had interpreted it.179 The Court also
mentioned how its decision cast doubts on the validity of how other
data screening statutes were applied.180 But state legislatures and
other courts were left the task of determining the precise application of the Data Screening decision to these laws.
As for the dissent, it found that the majority went too far in
failing to defer to the legislative branch to make decisions about the
use of data screening. Justice Haas did so on grounds regarding
democratic legitimacy. Absent from the dissent was any language
about need for deference to the police or other experts to gauge the
efficacy of technology and techniques in maintaining public security.
Indeed, even in the United States, where justices and judges
sometimes defer to the expertise of law enforcement or national
security experts, they tend to do so silently, or through rulings that
serve to permit these officials flexibility.181
Finally, the Constitutional Court was equally confident in the
strength of the democratic order in Germany and its capacity for
survival. Despite the danger of terrorism, it viewed its commitment
to the rule of law to be as necessary as it had ever been. In a long
series of decisions, the German Constitutional Court developed the
concept of a “militant democracy.”182 The constitutional order is
entitled to defend itself against those who would attempt to destroy
it.183 Yet, as the Constitutional Court stressed, a militant democracy
is permitted to use only measures consistent with the rule of law.184
In reference to the danger from terrorism, the Constitutional Court
stated in the Data Screening case: “The state may and must effectively confront terroristic efforts ... with necessary and constitu-

179. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 66-67, at 341).
180. Id. para. 157, at 367-68.
181. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (permitting law enforcement to fly over
private property without a search warrant when private flights are permitted and “there is
no indication that such flights are unheard of” in the relevant location); In re Sealed Case, 310
F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (upholding USA PATRIOT Act’s amendment to FISA and
noting both that the case “may involve the most serious threat our country faces” and even
if “the procedures and government showings” that FISA requires “do not meet the minimum
Fourth Amendment warrant standards,” they “certainly come close”).
182. KOMMERS, supra note 138, at 37-38.
183. Id. at 38.
184. 115 BVERFGE 320 (para. 126, at 357).
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tional measures reflecting the rule of law.”185 According to the court,
the government demonstrated “the power of the constitutional state
by its being bound to generally valid fundamental principles in its
relations with its enemies.”186 In an aside, the court added that
“absolute security” was, at any rate, impossible, and the role of the
government was simply to provide the “greatest possible security
under the actual circumstances.”187
B. Two Approaches to Informational Privacy
The preceding section addressed the question of two constitutional courts’ approaches through an institutional perspective. The
new constitutionalism of a court designed only to interpret a constitution has encouraged intense judicial involvement in developing
constitutional norms for preventive data screening. In this Section,
I wish to draw a further contrast regarding differences in substantive legal approaches to informational privacy.
In the view of James Whitman, there are stark differences between Europe and the United States regarding privacy.188 Whitman
argues that “on the two sides of the Atlantic, there are two different
cultures of privacy, which are home to different intuitive sensibilities, and which have produced two significantly different laws of
privacy.”189 Europeans are concerned with dignity, and Americans
are concerned with liberty.190 As a result of these divergent sensibilities, “[m]ost especially, state action will raise American hackles
much more often than European ones.”191 In contrast, “[c]ontinental
Europeans are consistently more drawn to problems touching on
public dignity.”192

185. Id. For an earlier case making the same point, see BVerfG Aug. 1, 1978, 49 BVERFGE
24 (56).
186. 115 BVERFGE 320 (127). For earlier cases making similar points, see BVerfG June 23,
2004, 111 BVERFGE 147 (158); BVerfG Sept. 5, 2003, 2 BVERFGE 1 (5); BVerfG May 1, 2001,
NJW 2076 (2077), 2001.
187. 115 BVERFGE 320 (127).
188. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
189. Id. at 1160.
190. Id. at 1164.
191. Id. at 1162.
192. Id.
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Although an examination of contemporary continental privacy
law is beyond the scope of this Article, it is fair to state that German
law does not support these distinctions. The Data Screening case,
and other recent cases of the Constitutional Court, reveal a legal
system that is, in fact, highly concerned about the government’s use
of personal data. Indeed, Whitman also finds Americans most concerned about privacy in the home, but, here, too, German constitutional law reveals a heightened sensibility.193 There are special
constitutional rules for the use of wiretaps in residences, and these
safeguards also played a role in 2008 in the Constitutional Court’s
decision concerning online surveillance.194
Moreover, the approach in the United States, whether at the level
of the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress, appears far less concerned
about liberty than permitting law enforcement a wide zone of
freedom in selecting the tools that it considers necessary to protect
public security. As a legislative example of such deference, we can
return to, and indeed expand, the earlier account of the congressional response to the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping after 9/11 in the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA).195
The FAA does not explicitly address the question of data mining.
Its language is general, but it does permit the government to
respond to uncertainty about the location of a target by drawing on
the capacities of data mining. The statute does so by permitting
“targeting of persons reasonably believed to be outside the United
States” when a “significant purpose” of the surveillance is to acquire
foreign intelligence information.196 The FAA removes FISA’s requirement of a judicial determination concerning the identity and
location of a specific “target of the surveillance.” Rather, the judicial
determination need only be that a process of surveillance is able to
target “persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United
States to acquire foreign intelligence information.”197
Moreover, to the extent that the FAA indirectly provides for
regulation of data mining, the process occurs outside of direct
193. Id.
194. BVerfG Feb. 27, 2008, 120 BVERFGE 274.
195. See supra text accompanying note 44.
196. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702(g)(2), 122 Stat. 2436, 2438
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 50 U.S.C.).
197. Id. § 702(a).
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congressional oversight. The statute assigns the critical roles to
the Attorney General and the FISC.198 The Attorney General
evaluates the NSA’s processes for minimization and targeting,
and the FISC provides a further check on these processes.199 The
Attorney General’s minimization procedures under the FAA, regarding the targeting of persons outside the United States, must
comply with FISA’s existing requirements.200 The FAA also requires
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Director of National
Intelligence to certify that targeting and minimization procedures
meet the statutory standards and that “a significant purpose” of the
surveillance is to acquire foreign intelligence information.201 As for
the FISC, it is required to review the targeting and minimization
procedures that are adopted.202 If a certification does not “contain[]
all the required elements,” or the procedures “are [not] consistent
with the requirements” of the FAA, the FISC must issue an order
directing the government to correct any deficiencies.203
This process is far from the kind of constitutionalization and
judicialization that is a hallmark of the German response to similar
situations. In the FAA, Congress has deferred to the executive
branch by assigning a role to the DOJ and the Director of National
Intelligence. It also crafts a role for the judiciary and, in particular,
the FISC, which serves as the final check on whether the NSA is
following the mandate of the statute. As concerns the Constitution,
the FAA does instruct the FISC to review whether it comports with
the Fourth Amendment.204 This language appears to represent a
last-ditch effort by those dubious of the statute to encourage the
FISC to approach it with some skepticism. Yet the bait has not been
taken; the FAA stands, and if there has been a FISC opinion about
any of its aspects, the court has not made it public.205
198. Id. § 702(d), (e).
199. Id.
200. Id. § 702(e)(1). As the leading FISA treatise explains, the idea of minimization
generally is that electronic surveillance pursuant to FISA be implemented to ensure
conformity to its “authorized purpose and scope” and in a fashion that requires the
government to collect the least amount of “irrelevant information.” KRIS & WILSON, supra note
49, § 9:1.
201. FISA Amendments Act § 701(i).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. There has been an opinion, however, upholding the Protect America Act, a stopgap
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Thus, we may have two cultures of privacy, but one of the most
important dividing lines concerns constitutional law. It is also worth
noting that both approaches appear stable at present within their
own countries. Despite occasional complaints from German legal
scholars and politicians about too much law coming from the
Federal Constitutional Court, this institution enjoys a high level of
prestige and acceptance. A general shorthand for the Constitutional
Court’s important role in Germany is the expression, the “Karlsruhe
Republic.” This term refers to the city in which the Constitutional
Court justices sit. In 1999, at the fiftieth anniversary of the
founding of the Federal Republic of Germany, Der Spiegel magazine
predicted that the “Karlsruhe Republic” had reached its apex, and
that the unification of Germany meant that a “Berlin Republic”
would diminish its influence.206 That has been far from the case. In
his keynote address at the Constitutional Court’s fiftieth anniversary in 2001, Gerhard Casper noted its great ability to engage in a
“continual definition of the polity with reference to essential
constitutional principles ... in a manner that has earned it attention
and respect worldwide.”207 Casper called his speech “The ‘Karlsruhe
Republic.’”208
To the extent that there is a threat to the stability of the German
model of constitutionalism, it comes from without rather than within. As a result of European integration, the German Constitutional
Court faces a new kind of challenge to its authority through the
development of important supranational institutions, including
the European Commission and European Court of Justice.209 The
measure enacted before the FAA. See In re Directives, 551 F.2d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008)
(stating that the Protect America Act represented a sufficiently reasonable exercise of
governmental power to satisfy the Fourth Amendment). In other litigation, a federal district
court upheld the FAA as constitutional, In re NSA Telecomm. Record Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d
949 (N.D. Cal. 2008), but the Second Circuit found standing for plaintiffs and permitted a
lawsuit alleging the unconstitutionality of the FAA to go forward. Amnesty Int’l USA v.
Clapper, 683 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011).
206. Thomas Darnstädt, “Mir hat keiner was zu sagen”: Die Allmacht des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, DER SPIEGEL, May 17, 1999, at 206.
207. Gerhard Casper, The “Karlsruhe Republic” - Keynote Address at the State Ceremony
Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the Federal Constitutional Court, 2 GER. L.J. para. 15
(2001), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=111.
208. Id.
209. SWEET, supra note 167, at 153-65. For a brief discussion of these institutions within
the context of data protection law, see CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION
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European Community legal system now has its own set of fundamental rights and its own obligations for member states.210 The
German Constitutional Court must navigate the requirements of
European constitutionalism and interpret new constraints on its
authority.211 In the data protection area, these decision-making loci
and new rivalries for authority have been most evident in the
ongoing debate about data retention.212 In the United States, there
is a similar kind of internal stability—and an absence of external
pressures in the form of supranational institutions. To be sure, legal
scholars have challenged the wisdom of the applicable constitutional
law decisions, with Miller and Smith in particular disfavor.213 The
exception that proves the rules comes from Orin Kerr, who has
generally defended the merits of the Supreme Court’s approach to
new surveillance technology.214 Despite the general unease of the
LAW 1-41 (2d ed. 2007).
210. SWEET, supra note 167, at 153-61.
211. The German Constitutional Court executes its jurisdiction in a cooperative
relationship with the European Court of Justice. BVerfG Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVERFGE 155
(para. 70, at 175). As long as the European Court of Justice or other institutions of the
European Communities provide effective protection in this regard, the Constitutional Court
will refrain from exercising its jurisdiction over basic rights violations by acts of the European
Community. BVerfG Oct. 22, 1986, 73 BVERFGE 339 (para. 132, at 387).
212. A European Directive from 2006 requires Member States to enact national data
retention statues. Directive 2006/24/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision
of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks
and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 105) 54-63. In 2010, the German
Constitutional Court invalidated the relevant German legislation. BVerfG Mar. 2, 2010, 125
BVerfGE 260. Subsequently, and despite much debate, the German legislature has been
unable to enact a new data retention statute. The EU is now threatening Germany with
sanctions for failure to enact such legislation. EU leitet Verfahren gegen Deutschland ein, DIE
WELT (GER.), June 22, 2011, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article13443492/EUleitet-Verfahren-gegen-Deutschland-ein.html.
Finally, there may be a decision about the Data Retention Directive itself at the European
Court of Justice. The Irish High Court has asked the European Court of Justice to decide
whether the Data Retention Directive itself violates the European Charter of Human Rights.
Ian Brown, Communications Data Retention in an Evolving Internet, 19 INT’L J.L. & INFO.
TECH. 95, 96 (2011). In its own expert opinion, the German Parliament has already found that
the Data Retention Directive does not meet the requirements of the European Charter of
Human Rights. ROLAND DERKSEN, WISSENSCHAFTLICHE DIENST, [BT], WD 11-3000-18/11,
AUSARBEITUNG: ZUR VEREINBARKEIT DER RICHTLINIE ÜBER DIE VORRATSSPEICHERUNG VON
DATEN MIT DER EUROPÄISCHEN GRUNDRECHTECHARTA (2011).
213. See, e.g., Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105 (2009).
214. For his most recent efforts in this regard, see Orin Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment
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academy, however, the Supreme Court seems unlikely to revisit
these decisions, and Congress seems unwilling to bolster informational privacy vis-à-vis the state through any strong, new protections.
This study will conclude with a brief account of a Supreme Court
case from this term. In NASA v. Nelson, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on a case that might have permitted it to revisit its
contested right of information privacy, which it first articulated in
Whalen v. Roe, a decision from 1977.215 This earlier opinion might
have been used to bolster the Fourth Amendment privacy right but
instead has largely receded from case law. In an 8-0 decision, the
Nelson Court decided that it would neither praise nor bury
Whalen.216 Its decision was to bracket the question of the continuing
validity of the right of information privacy; it stated its explicit
assumption that “the Government’s challenged inquiries implicate
a privacy interest of constitutional significance.”217 It could do so
because the governmental contractors in the case would lose
regardless of whether such an interest existed.218 In separate
concurrences in this result, both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
expressed their view that the Constitution lacked any right to
informational privacy.219 Given the approach in Nelson, the Supreme
Court is not likely to develop its constitutional standards for
informational privacy or apply the Fourth Amendment to those new
technologies that involve information collection and processing.
This Article began by suggesting that the law in different
countries sometimes will “see” different things when considering
the same or similar phenomenon. Such a situation exists for the
regulation of data mining in Germany and the United States. These
distinctly different approaches point to one reason for the difficulties
in reaching agreement on international data sharing accords.220 The
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). For his earlier work,
see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009). For a
skeptical response, see Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s
Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747 (2005).
215. NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977).
216. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 746-57.
217. Id. at 756-57.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring).
220. See, e.g., Francesca Bignami, supra note 57, at 609 (explaining the illegality under
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E.U.-U.S. negotiations on the transfer of aircraft passenger data is
an example of such complex, multi-year negotiations.221 Although
such agreements have been reached, the different starting points for
the two countries demonstrate the great obstacles that the necessary negotiations must surmount.
CONCLUSION
The legal systems in Germany and the United States respond in
different ways to the use of data mining by the government for law
enforcement and national security purposes. The German Federal
Constitutional Court has set strict limits on the conditions for use
of “data screening,” the German term for this practice. Its focus has
been on regulating the use of this technique in a “preventive”
fashion, that is, before a crime has occurred. Among the limits that
it identified in the Basic Law, the German constitution, the
Constitutional Court has found data screening to be constitutional
only if justified by the existence of a “concrete danger” for the
security of the country, an individual state, or the life of a citizen.
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed a Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that effectively forecloses the possibility
of meaningful constitutional protections from governmental data
mining. This result follows from long-established precedents,
developed in the era before widespread use of computers. The
Supreme Court appears unlikely to revisit its critical decisions, and
at the statutory level, moreover, the law of criminal procedure in the
United States simply does not consider data mining a “search.” This
Article concluded that these quite different approaches point to one
underlying reason for the difficulty sometimes present in negotiating international data sharing accords.

E.U. law of data mining of databases in a fashion similar to that carried out by the NSA in
the United States).
221. For a 2007 opinion of the Article 29 Working Party that sets out the background of
this issue, see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2007 on the follow-up
agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing
and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States
Department of Homeland Security concluded in July 2007 (Aug. 17, 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp138_en.pdf.

